Full Title: Market and Behavioral Barriers to Energy Efficiency: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Case for Tariff Financing in California
Author(s): K. Sydny Fujita
Publisher(s): Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Publication Date: June 1, 2011
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Description (excerpt):
Consumers regularly forgo purchases of high efficiency appliances that appear to be cost effective at a reasonable rate of return. While some argue that this is a true revelation of preferences for appliance features, this “efficiency gap” can be largely explained by a combination of market and behavioral failures that reduce consumers’ ability to evaluate the relative value of appliances and skew preferences toward initial cost savings, undervaluing future reductions in operating costs. These failures and barriers include externalities of energy use, imperfect competition between manufacturers, asymmetric information, bounded rationality, split incentives, and transaction costs (Golove 1996).
Recognizing the social benefit of energy conservation, several major methods are used by policymakers to ensure that efficient appliances are purchased: minimum efficiency standards, Energy Star labeling, and rebates and tax credits. There is no single market for energy services; there are hundreds of uses, thousands of intermediaries, and millions of users, and likewise, no single appropriate government intervention (Golove 1996). Complementary approaches must be implemented, considering policy and institutional limitations.