2017 State of the Market Report for PJM

March 8, 2018 Eagleville, PA Joe Bowring



Market Monitoring Unit

- Monitoring Analytics, LLC
 - Independent company
 - Formed August 1, 2008
- Independent Market Monitor for PJM
 - Independent from Market Participants
 - Independent from RTO management
 - Independent from RTO board of managers
- MMU Accountability
 - To FERC (per FERC MMU Orders and MM Plan)
 - To PJM markets
 - To PJM Board for administration of the contract

Role of Market Monitoring

- Market monitoring is required by FERC Orders
- Role of competition under FERC regulation
 - Mechanism to regulate prices
 - Competitive outcome = just and reasonable
- FERC has enforcement authority
- Relevant model of competition is not laissez faire
- Competitive outcomes are not automatic
- Detailed rules required
- Detailed monitoring required:
 - Of participants
 - 。 Of RTO
 - Of rules



Role of Market Monitoring

- Market monitoring is primarily analytical
 - Adequacy of market rules
 - Compliance with market rules
 - Exercise of market power
 - Market manipulation
- Market monitoring provides inputs to prospective mitigation
- Market monitoring provides retrospective mitigation
- Market monitoring provides information
 - 。 To FERC
 - To state regulators
 - To market participants
 - To RTO




Market Monitoring Plan

- Monitor compliance with rules.
- Monitor actual or potential design flaws in rules.
- Monitor structural problems in the PJM market.
- Monitor the potential of market participants to exercise market power.
- Monitor for market manipulation.



PJM's footprint and its 20 control zones



The energy market results were competitive

Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure: Aggregate Market	Partially Competitive	
Market Structure: Local Market	Not Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Competitive	
Market Performance	Competitive	Effective



Recommendations: Energy Market

- Cost based offers equal to short run marginal cost
 - Replace Manual 15 with clear definitions for cost-based offers
 - Clear definition of relevant operating expenses
 - Fuel cost policies: algorithmic, verifiable, systematic
- OEM parameters from CONE unit should be used for performance assessment and uplift
- Define explicit rules related to use of transmission penalty factors in setting LMP.
- Improve scarcity pricing.
- Local market power mitigation improvements (TPS)
 - Constant markup on price and cost based offers
 - Cost based offer with same fuel as price based offer
 - PLS parameters at least as flexible as price based offer




Total price per MWh by category: 2016 and 2017

			2016 Percent of		2017 Percent of	
Category	2016	\$/MWh	Total 2017	\$/MWh	Total	Percent Change
Load Weighted Energy		\$29.23	58.5%	\$30.99	58.2%	6.0%
Capacity		\$10.96	21.9%	\$11.23	21.1%	2.5%
Capacity		\$10.96	21.9%	\$11.23	21.1%	2.5%
Capacity (FRR)		\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.00	0.0%	0.0%
Transmission		\$8.42	16.8%	\$9.57	18.0%	13.7%
Transmission Service Charges		\$7.81	15.6%	\$8.84	16.6%	13.1%
Transmission Enhancement Cost Recovery		\$0.52	1.0%	\$0.64	1.2%	24.2%
Transmission Owner (Schedule 1A)		\$0.09	0.2%	\$0.10	0.2%	3.4%
Transmission Facility Charges		\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.00	0.0%	(100.0%)
Ancillary		\$0.72	1.4%	\$0.78	1.5%	8.9%
Reactive		\$0.38	0.8%	\$0.44	0.8%	14.8%
Regulation		\$0.11	0.2%	\$0.14	0.3%	26.8%
Black Start		\$0.09	0.2%	\$0.09	0.2%	4.3%
Synchronized Reserves		\$0.05	0.1%	\$0.06	0.1%	5.5%
Non-Synchronized Reserves		\$0.01	0.0%	\$0.01	0.0%	1.1%
Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (DASR)		\$0.07	0.1%	\$0.05	0.1%	(38.7%)
Administration		\$0.47	0.9%	\$0.52	1.0%	9.6%
PJM Administrative Fees		\$0.44	0.9%	\$0.48	0.9%	10.0%
NERC/RFC		\$0.03	0.1%	\$0.03	0.1%	4.2%
RTO Startup and Expansion		\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.00	0.0%	3.3%
Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves)		\$0.17	0.3%	\$0.14	0.3%	(16.9%)
Demand Response		\$0.01	0.0%	\$0.01	0.0%	(35.3%)
Load Response		\$0.01	0.0%	\$0.01	0.0%	(35.3%)
Emergency Load Response		\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.00	0.0%	0.0%
Emergency Energy		\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.00	0.0%	0.0%
Total Price		\$49.99	100.0%	\$53.24	100.0%	6.5%


PJM Load: 1998 through 2017

			<u> </u>					
	PJM Real-Time Demand (MWh)				Year-to-Year	ar Change		
	Lo	ad	Load Plus	Exports	Lo	ad	Load Plus Exports	
		Standard		Standard		Standard		Standard
	Load	Deviation	Demand	Deviation	Load	Deviation	Demand	Deviation
1998	28,578	5,511	28,578	5,511	NA	NA	NA	NA
1999	29,641	5,955	29,641	5,955	3.7%	8.1%	3.7%	8.1%
2000	30,113	5,529	31,341	5,728	1.6%	(7.2%)	5.7%	(3.8%)
2001	30,297	5,873	32,165	5,564	0.6%	6.2%	2.6%	(2.9%)
2002	35,776	7,976	37,676	8,145	18.1%	35.8%	17.1%	46.4%
2003	37,395	6,834	39,380	6,716	4.5%	(14.3%)	4.5%	(17.5%)
2004	49,963	13,004	54,953	14,947	33.6%	90.3%	39.5%	122.6%
2005	78,150	16,296	85,301	16,546	56.4%	25.3%	55.2%	10.7%
2006	79,471	14,534	85,696	15,133	1.7%	(10.8%)	0.5%	(8.5%)
2007	81,681	14,618	87,897	15,199	2.8%	0.6%	2.6%	0.4%
2008	79,515	13,758	86,306	14,322	(2.7%)	(5.9%)	(1.8%)	(5.8%)
2009	76,034	13,260	81,227	13,792	(4.4%)	(3.6%)	(5.9%)	(3.7%)
2010	79,611	15,504	85,518	15,904	4.7%	16.9%	5.3%	15.3%
2011	82,541	16,156	88,466	16,313	3.7%	4.2%	3.4%	2.6%
2012	87,011	16,212	92,135	16,052	5.4%	0.3%	4.1%	(1.6%)
2013	88,332	15,489	92,879	15,418	1.5%	(4.5%)	0.8%	(3.9%)
2014	89,099	15,763	94,471	15,677	0.9%	1.8%	1.7%	1.7%
2015	88,594	16,663	92,665	16,784	(0.6%)	5.7%	(1.9%)	7.1%
2016	88,601	17,229	93,551	17,498	0.0%	3.4%	1.0%	4.3%
2017	86,618	15,170	90,755	15,082	(2.2%)	(11.9%)	(3.0%)	(13.8%)
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PJM real-time monthly average hourly load



Average RT generation supply curves: summer



PJM generation by fuel source


		2016		2017	7	Change in
		GWh	Percent	GWh	Percent	Output
Coal		275,289.4	33.9%	256,613.8	31.8%	(6.8%)
	Bituminous	241,050.2	29.7%	220,789.4	27.3%	(8.4%)
	Sub Bituminous	28,949.8	3.6%	28,016.0	3.5%	(3.2%)
	Other Coal	5,289.5	0.7%	7,808.4	1.0%	47.6%
Nuclear		279,546.4	34.4%	287,575.8	35.6%	2.9%
Gas		217,199.0	26.7%	219,205.1	27.1%	0.9%
	Natural Gas	215,021.4	26.5%	216,758.6	26.8%	0.8%
	Landfill Gas	2,177.6	0.3%	2,433.1	0.3%	11.7%
	Other Gas	0.0	0.0%	13.4	0.0%	NA
Hydroelec	tric	13,686.8	1.7%	14,868.4	1.8%	8.6%
	Pumped Storage	4,840.2	0.6%	5,132.6	0.6%	6.0%
	Run of River	7,332.8	0.9%	8,119.8	1.0%	10.7%
	Other Hydro	1,513.8	0.2%	1,616.0	0.2%	6.8%
Wind		17,716.0	2.2%	20,714.1	2.6%	16.9%
Waste		4,358.9	0.5%	3,984.1	0.5%	(8.6%)
	Solid Waste	4,139.8	0.5%	3,740.7	0.5%	(9.6%)
	Miscellaneous	219.2	0.0%	243.4	0.0%	11.1%
Oil		2,163.2	0.3%	2,301.7	0.3%	6.4%
	Heavy Oil	270.7	0.0%	174.4	0.0%	(35.6%)
	Light Oil	340.7	0.0%	340.3	0.0%	(0.1%)
	Diesel	59.4	0.0%	81.7	0.0%	37.5%
	Gasoline	0.0	0.0%	0.0	0.0%	NA
	Kerosene	74.8	0.0%	15.2	0.0%	(79.6%)
	Jet Oil	0.0	0.0%	3.1	0.0%	NA
	Other Oil	1,417.7	0.2%	1,687.0	0.2%	19.0%
Solar, Net	Energy Metering	1,019.4	0.1%	1,468.7	0.2%	44.1%
Energy St	orage	15.7	0.0%	25.1	0.0%	59.6%
	Battery	15.7	0.0%	25.1	0.0%	59.6%
	Compressed Air	0.0	0.0%	0.0	0.0%	NA
Biofuel		1,541.5	0.2%	1,473.0	0.2%	(4.4%)
Geotherm	al	0.0	0.0%	0.0	0.0%	NA
Other Fue	l Type	0.0	0.0%	0.0	0.0%	NA
Total		812,536.3	100.0%	808,229.7	100.0%	(0.5%)

PJM capacity factor by unit type


	2016		201	17	Change in 2017
Unit Type	Generation (GWh)	Capacity Factor	Generation (GWh)	Capacity Factor	from 2016
Battery	15.7	0.6%	25.0	0.9%	0.3%
Combined Cycle	187,654.5	62.0%	194,099.5	58.0%	(4.1%)
Combustion Turbine	17,265.2	6.9%	13,227.2	5.2%	(1.7%)
Diesel	662.7	19.6%	716.7	19.1%	(0.4%)
Diesel (Landfill gas)	1,489.0	50.3%	1,628.2	50.1%	(0.2%)
Fuel Cell	227.6	86.4%	224.8	85.5%	(0.8%)
Nuclear	279,546.4	91.3%	285,021.3	93.3%	2.0%
Pumped Storage Hydro	6,077.2	13.7%	6,448.2	14.6%	0.9%
Run of River Hydro	7,609.6	31.4%	8,352.5	31.9%	0.5%
Solar	1,000.9	17.3%	1,453.5	17.0%	(0.3%)
Steam	293,253.4	41.1%	268,452.3	40.2%	(0.9%)
Coal	276,539.4	46.2%	255,134.5	46.0%	(0.2%)
Natural Gas	10,463.1	12.3%	7,679.9	9.1%	(3.1%)
Oil	258.4	1.3%	154.6	0.8%	(0.5%)
Biomass	5,992.5	63.6%	5,483.3	58.3%	(5.2%)
Wind	17,716.0	27.6%	20,534.6	29.3%	1.7%
Total	812,518.2	47.2%	800,183.8	46.5%	(0.7%)



Fuel diversity index for energy




PJM real-time generation less real-time load




PJM real-time, load-weighted, average LMP

	Real-Time, Load-	Weighted, Av	erage LMP	Yea	r-to-Year Char	ige
			Standard			Standard
	Average	Median	Deviation	Average	Median	Deviation
1998	\$24.16	\$17.60	\$39.29	NA	NA	NA
1999	\$34.07	\$19.02	\$91.49	41.0%	8.1%	132.8%
2000	\$30.72	\$20.51	\$28.38	(9.8%)	7.9%	(69.0%)
2001	\$36.65	\$25.08	\$57.26	19.3%	22.3%	101.8%
2002	\$31.60	\$23.40	\$26.75	(13.8%)	(6.7%)	(53.3%)
2003	\$41.23	\$34.96	\$25.40	30.5%	49.4%	(5.0%)
2004	\$44.34	\$40.16	\$21.25	7.5%	14.9%	(16.3%)
2005	\$63.46	\$52.93	\$38.10	43.1%	31.8%	79.3%
2006	\$53.35	\$44.40	\$37.81	(15.9%)	(16.1%)	(0.7%)
2007	\$61.66	\$54.66	\$36.94	15.6%	23.1%	(2.3%)
2008	\$71.13	\$59.54	\$40.97	15.4%	8.9%	10.9%
2009	\$39.05	\$34.23	\$18.21	(45.1%)	(42.5%)	(55.6%)
2010	\$48.35	\$39.13	\$28.90	23.8%	14.3%	58.7%
2011	\$45.94	\$36.54	\$33.47	(5.0%)	(6.6%)	15.8%
2012	\$35.23	\$30.43	\$23.66	(23.3%)	(16.7%)	(29.3%)
2013	\$38.66	\$33.25	\$23.78	9.7%	9.3%	0.5%
2014	\$53.14	\$36.20	\$76.20	37.4%	8.9%	220.4%
2015	\$36.16	\$27.66	\$31.06	(31.9%)	(23.6%)	(59.2%)
2016	\$29.23	\$25.01	\$16.12	(19.2%)	(9.6%)	(48.1%)
2017	\$30.99	\$26.35	\$19.32	6.0%	5.4%	19.9%

PJM real-time, load-weighted, average LMP




PJM real-time, load-weighted, average LMP




\$20.26 \$27.83 \$28.69 \$29.44 \$30.99 \$31.12 \$31.22 \$31.28 \$31.36 \$31.44 \$31.49 \$31.57 \$31.64 \$31.74 \$31.81 \$31.89 \$31.97 \$32.07 \$32.26 \$32.62 \$32.88 \$34.22 \$36.45 \$40.81




Spot average fuel prices



Short run marginal costs of generation



Type of fuel used by real-time marginal units




PJM RT annual, fuel-cost adjusted, load-weighted average LMP

	20	017 Fuel-Cost Adjusted, Load	
	2017 Load-Weighted LMP	Weighted LMP	Change
Average	\$30.99	\$25.39	(18.1%)
	20	017 Fuel-Cost Adjusted, Load	
	2016 Load-Weighted LMP	Weighted LMP	Change
Average	\$29.23	\$25.39	(13.1%)
	2016 Load-Weighted LMP	2017 Load-Weighted LMP	Change
Average	\$29.23	\$30.99	6.0%

Components of PJM RT (Unadjusted), loadweighted, average LMP

	2016		2017		Change
Element	Contribution to LMP	Percent	Contribution to LMP	Percent	Percent
Gas	\$7.76	26.5%	\$12.15	39.2%	12.7%
Coal	\$13.44	46.0%	\$8.97	28.9%	(17.0%)
Markup	\$0.27	0.9%	\$2.55	8.2%	7.3%
Ten Percent Adder	\$2.43	8.3%	\$2.39	7.7%	(0.6%)
VOM	\$2.04	7.0%	\$1.70	5.5%	(1.5%)
NA	\$1.48	5.1%	\$0.81	2.6%	(2.5%)
LPA Rounding Difference	\$0.15	0.5%	\$0.78	2.5%	2.0%
Oil	\$0.24	0.8%	\$0.44	1.4%	0.6%
NO _x Cost	\$0.42	1.4%	\$0.41	1.3%	(0.1%)
Increase Generation Adder	\$0.41	1.4%	\$0.39	1.2%	(0.2%)
Ancillary Service Redispatch Cost	\$0.32	1.1%	\$0.25	0.8%	(0.3%)
CO ₂ Cost	\$0.09	0.3%	\$0.09	0.3%	(0.0%)
SO ₂ Cost	\$0.07	0.3%	\$0.06	0.2%	(0.1%)
Other	\$0.15	0.5%	\$0.06	0.2%	(0.3%)
Scarcity Adder	\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.05	0.2%	0.2%
Municipal Waste	\$0.04	0.1%	\$0.05	0.2%	0.0%
Opportunity Cost Adder	\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.04	0.1%	0.1%
Market-to-Market Adder	\$0.01	0.0%	\$0.00	0.0%	(0.0%)
Uranium	\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.00	0.0%	(0.0%)
Constraint Violation Adder	\$0.00	0.0%	\$0.00	0.0%	0.0%
LPA-SCED Differential	(\$0.01)	(0.0%)	(\$0.01)	(0.0%)	0.0%
Decrease Generation Adder	(\$0.03)	(0.1%)	(\$0.07)	(0.2%)	(0.1%)
Wind	(\$0.05)	(0.2%)	(\$0.11)	(0.4%)	(0.2%)
Total	\$29.23	100.0%	\$30.99	100.0%	0.0%


Days with pivotal suppliers in the PJM Day-Ahead Energy Market: 2017



Offer capping statistics – energy only

	Real Tir	ne	Day Ahead		
	Unit Hours	MW	Unit Hours	MW	
Year	Capped	Capped	Capped	Capped	
2013	0.4%	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%	
2014	0.5%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	
2015	0.4%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	
2016	0.4%	0.2%	0.1%	0.0%	
2017	0.3%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	

Monthly bid and cleared INCs, DECs and UTCs




PJM UTC transactions by type of parent

	2016				2017			
	Total Up to		Total Up to Congestion		Total Up to		Total Up to Congestion	
Category	Congestion Bid MWh	Percent	Cleared MWh	Percent	Congestion Bid MWh	Percent	Cleared MWh	Percent
Financial	1,198,418,888	96.0%	282,808,931	93.6%	1,180,634,460	98.1%	293,713,948	96.0%
Physical	49,564,960	4.0%	19,231,146	6.4%	23,152,092	1.9%	12,250,315	4.0%
Total	1,247,983,848	100.0%	302,040,077	100.0%	1,203,786,552	100.0%	305,964,263	100.0%

Total PJM congestion

Cor	ngestion Costs (Mill	ions)	
		Total PJM	Percent of PJM
Congestion Cost	Percent Change	Billing	Billing
\$2,052	NA	\$34,306	6.0%
\$719	(65.0%)	\$26,550	2.7%
\$1,423	98.0%	\$34,771	4.1%
\$999	(29.8%)	\$35,887	2.8%
\$529	(47.0%)	\$29,181	1.8%
\$677	28.0%	\$33,860	2.0%
\$1,932	185.5%	\$50,030	3.9%
\$1,385	(28.3%)	\$42,630	3.2%
\$1,024	(26.1%)	\$39,050	2.6%
\$698	(31.9%)	\$40,170	1.7%
	\$2,052 \$719 \$1,423 \$999 \$529 \$677 \$1,932 \$1,385 \$1,024	Congestion Cost Percent Change \$2,052 NA \$719 (65.0%) \$1,423 98.0% \$999 (29.8%) \$529 (47.0%) \$677 28.0% \$1,932 185.5% \$1,385 (28.3%) \$1,024 (26.1%)	Congestion Cost Percent Change Billing \$2,052 NA \$34,306 \$719 (65.0%) \$26,550 \$1,423 98.0% \$34,771 \$999 (29.8%) \$35,887 \$529 (47.0%) \$29,181 \$677 28.0% \$33,860 \$1,932 185.5% \$50,030 \$1,385 (28.3%) \$42,630 \$1,024 (26.1%) \$39,050

PJM monthly total congestion cost



The capacity market results were competitive

Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure: Aggregate Market	Not Competitive	
Market Structure: Local Market	Not Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Competitive	
Market Performance	Competitive	Mixed



Recommendations: Capacity Market


- Implement a MOPR for existing units (MOPR-Ex).
- All capacity imports should be deliverable to an LDA.
- Consistent definition of a capacity resource as physical at time of auction and delivery year.
- Definition of LDA should be dynamic and market based.
- Offer cap calculation should be based on economic logic of CP and actual PAH and not default to Net CONE*B.
- Net revenue calculation for offer caps should be based on lower of price or cost.
- Improve market clearing rules by including make whole and nesting in optimization.
- Maintain performance incentives and product definitions in Capacity Performance design.
- RMR rules should be modified.




PJM installed capacity by fuel source

	1-Jan-17		31-May-17		1-Jun-17		31-Dec-17	
	MW	Percent	MW	Percent	MW	Percent	MW	Percent
Coal	66,622.2	36.5%	66,941.3	36.5%	65,688.0	35.9%	65,144.0	35.4%
Gas	65,110.3	35.7%	65,787.1	35.9%	66,397.6	36.3%	67,726.4	36.8%
Hydroelectric	8,850.4	4.9%	8,850.4	4.8%	8,870.2	4.8%	8,856.2	4.8%
Nuclear	33,043.4	18.1%	33,103.7	18.0%	33,163.5	18.1%	33,163.5	18.0%
Oil	6,733.6	3.7%	6,687.0	3.6%	6,684.4	3.7%	6,672.2	3.6%
Solar	262.3	0.1%	268.0	0.1%	366.8	0.2%	373.2	0.2%
Solid waste	769.4	0.4%	769.4	0.4%	814.4	0.4%	809.4	0.4%
Wind	1,019.1	0.6%	1,079.1	0.6%	1,114.3	0.6%	1,136.7	0.6%
Total	182,410.7	100.0%	183,486.0	100.0%	183,099.2	100.0%	183,881.6	100.0%


Percent of PJM installed capacity by fuel source




Fuel Diversity Index for PJM installed capacity




PJM EFORd




PJM capacity prices




PJM capacity prices




New entrant CT net revenue




New entrant CC net revenue




New entrant CP net revenue




New entrant nuclear net revenue



Historical new entrant CC revenue adequacy





Proportion of units recovering avoidable costs

Units with full recovery from energy and ancillary net revenue								Uni	ts with	full re	covery	from a	ll mark	ets
Technology	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
CC - Combined Cycle	55%	46%	50%	72%	59%	63%	62%	85%	79%	79%	95%	88%	93%	86%
CT - Aero Derivative	15%	6%	6%	53%	15%	8%	23%	100%	96%	76%	98%	100%	99%	99%
CT - Industrial Frame	26%	23%	17%	38%	13%	8%	18%	99%	98%	83%	100%	100%	100%	99%
Coal Fired	-		25%	78%	18%	19%	19%	/ -	-	54%	83%	69%	40%	52%
Diesel	48%	42%	37%	69%	56%	33%	46%	100%	100%	77%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Hydro	74%	61%	95%	97%	81%	79%	95%	81%	77%	97%	98%	100%	100%	97%
Nuclear	-	-	79%	100%	53%	16%	21%	-	-	95%	100%	89%	58%	68%
Oil or Gas Steam	8%	6%	11%	15%	3%	0%	9%	92%	78%	86%	85%	91%	88%	88%
Pumped Storage	100%	100%	95%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Nuclear unit surplus (shortfall): historical price data 2013 through 2017

								Surp	olus (Short	fall) (\$/MWh)					
		1	100% of	NEI Cap	ital Costs	\$		2/3 of N	El Capital	Costs			1/3 of NEI	Capital Co	sts	
	ICAP	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Beaver Valley	1,777	\$3.6	\$13.8	\$4.2	(\$0.8)	\$1.4	\$5.6	\$15.8	\$6.3	\$1.3	\$3.5	\$7.7	\$17.9	\$8.3	\$3.3	\$5.5
Braidwood	2,330	(\$0.4)	\$9.3	(\$0.2)	(\$3.5)	(\$2.7)	\$1.6	\$11.3	\$1.9	(\$1.5)	(\$0.6)	\$3.7	\$13.4	\$3.9	\$0.6	\$1.4
Byron	2,300	(\$1.5)	\$7.0	(\$5.1)	(\$9.9)	(\$3.9)	\$0.6	\$9.0	(\$3.1)	(\$7.8)	(\$1.8)	\$2.6	\$11.1	(\$1.0)	(\$5.8)	\$0.2
Calvert Cliffs	1,716	\$16.4	\$33.5	\$15.1	\$6.8	\$4.9	\$18.5	\$35.5	\$17.2	\$8.9	\$7.0	\$20.5	\$37.6	\$19.2	\$10.9	\$9.0
Cook	2,071	\$3.5	\$12.4	\$3.8	(\$0.9)	\$0.3	\$5.5	\$14.5	\$5.8	\$1.2	\$2.4	\$7.6	\$16.5	\$7.9	\$3.2	\$4.4
Davis Besse	894	(\$4.3)	\$9.4	\$1.4	(\$4.6)	(\$7.6)	(\$1.4)	\$12.2	\$4.3	(\$1.7)	(\$4.8)	\$1.5	\$15.1	\$7.2	\$1.2	(\$1.9)
Dresden	1,787	\$1.2	\$11.1	\$1.3	(\$1.9)	(\$1.3)	\$3.2	\$13.2	\$3.4	\$0.1	\$0.7	\$5.3	\$15.2	\$5.4	\$2.2	\$2.8
Hope Creek	1,161	\$14.2	\$27.9	\$7.2	(\$2.6)	\$0.1	\$16.2	\$30.0	\$9.3	(\$0.6)	\$2.2	\$18.3	\$32.0	\$11.3	\$1.5	\$4.2
LaSalle	2,238	\$0.3	\$9.8	\$0.1	(\$3.9)	(\$3.0)	\$2.3	\$11.8	\$2.2	(\$1.8)	(\$0.9)	\$4.4	\$13.9	\$4.2	\$0.2	\$1.1
Limerick	2,296	\$14.0	\$27.7	\$7.5	(\$2.5)	\$0.3	\$16.1	\$29.7	\$9.5	(\$0.4)	\$2.4	\$18.1	\$31.8	\$11.6	\$1.6	\$4.4
North Anna	1,891	\$7.9	\$25.3	\$11.9	\$2.7	\$3.6	\$9.9	\$27.3	\$14.0	\$4.7	\$5.6	\$12.0	\$29.4	\$16.0	\$6.8	\$7.7
Oyster Creek	615	\$5.6	\$19.0	(\$1.9)	(\$11.8)	(\$8.9)	\$8.5	\$21.9	\$1.0	(\$8.9)	(\$6.0)	\$11.4	\$24.8	\$3.9	(\$6.0)	(\$3.1)
Quad Cities	1,819	(\$4.7)	\$2.6	(\$6.7)	(\$9.8)	(\$4.6)	(\$2.7)	\$4.7	(\$4.6)	(\$7.7)	(\$2.5)	(\$0.6)	\$6.7	(\$2.6)	(\$5.7)	(\$0.5)
Peach Bottom	2,251	\$14.1	\$27.5	\$6.8	(\$2.8)	\$0.1	\$16.2	\$29.5	\$8.8	(\$0.7)	\$2.2	\$18.2	\$31.6	\$10.9	\$1.3	\$4.2
Perry	1,240	(\$3.7)	\$8.3	\$2.2	(\$4.6)	(\$6.6)	(\$0.8)	\$11.2	\$5.1	(\$1.7)	(\$3.7)	\$2.0	\$14.1	\$8.0	\$1.2	(\$0.8)
Salem	2,332	\$14.1	\$27.9	\$7.2	(\$2.6)	\$0.1	\$16.2	\$29.9	\$9.2	(\$0.6)	\$2.2	\$18.2	\$32.0	\$11.3	\$1.5	\$4.2
Surry	1,690	\$7.3	\$23.7	\$11.8	\$2.3	\$3.4	\$9.4	\$25.7	\$13.8	\$4.3	\$5.5	\$11.4	\$27.8	\$15.9	\$6.4	\$7.5
Susquehanna	2,520	\$12.9	\$26.5	\$7.3	(\$2.2)	\$0.5	\$15.0	\$28.6	\$9.3	(\$0.1)	\$2.5	\$17.0	\$30.6	\$11.4	\$1.9	\$4.6
Three Mile Island	805	\$3.3	\$16.3	(\$4.0)	(\$12.6)	(\$9.3)	\$6.1	\$19.2	(\$1.1)	(\$9.7)	(\$6.4)	\$9.0	\$22.1	\$1.8	(\$6.8)	(\$3.5)

Nuclear unit surplus (shortfall): forward price data 2013 through 2017

		Surplus (Shortfall) (\$/MWh)								
	100% of l	NEI Capital	Costs	2/3 of N	El Capital	Costs	1/3 of N	El Capital	Costs	
·	2018	2019	2020	2018	2019	2020	2018	2019	2020	
Beaver Valley	\$8.81	\$8.16	\$6.41	\$10.86	\$10.21	\$8.46	\$12.91	\$12.26	\$10.51	
Braidwood	\$4.28	\$6.45	\$5.75	\$6.33	\$8.50	\$7.80	\$8.38	\$10.55	\$9.85	
Byron	\$4.64	\$5.59	\$4.95	\$6.69	\$7.64	\$7.00	\$8.74	\$9.69	\$9.05	
Calvert Cliffs	\$10.93	\$10.65	\$9.10	\$12.98	\$12.70	\$11.15	\$15.03	\$14.75	\$13.20	
Cook	\$7.57	\$6.94	\$5.22	\$9.62	\$8.99	\$7.27	\$11.67	\$11.04	\$9.32	
Davis Besse	(\$1.04)	(\$1.57)	(\$3.30)	\$1.85	\$1.32	(\$0.41)	\$4.74	\$4.21	\$2.48	
Dresden	\$6.68	\$8.41	\$7.74	\$8.73	\$10.46	\$9.79	\$10.78	\$12.51	\$11.84	
Hope Creek	\$7.46	\$7.19	\$6.93	\$9.51	\$9.24	\$8.98	\$11.56	\$11.29	\$11.03	
LaSalle	\$4.38	\$6.49	\$5.80	\$6.43	\$8.54	\$7.85	\$8.48	\$10.59	\$9.90	
Limerick	\$8.00	\$7.74	\$7.48	\$10.05	\$9.79	\$9.53	\$12.10	\$11.84	\$11.58	
North Anna	\$10.77	\$10.32	\$8.53	\$12.82	\$12.37	\$10.58	\$14.87	\$14.42	\$12.63	
Oyster Creek	(\$1.56)	(\$1.53)	(\$1.79)	\$1.33	\$1.36	\$1.10	\$4.22	\$4.25	\$3.99	
Quad Cities	\$2.77	\$4.36	\$3.65	\$4.82	\$6.41	\$5.70	\$6.87	\$8.46	\$7.75	
Peach Bottom	\$7.46	\$7.29	\$7.04	\$9.51	\$9.34	\$9.09	\$11.56	\$11.39	\$11.14	
Perry	\$0.04	(\$0.58)	(\$2.32)	\$2.93	\$2.31	\$0.57	\$5.82	\$5.20	\$3.46	
Salem	\$7.44	\$7.16	\$6.90	\$9.49	\$9.21	\$8.95	\$11.54	\$11.26	\$11.00	
Surry	\$10.39	\$9.86	\$8.08	\$12.44	\$11.91	\$10.13	\$14.49	\$13.96	\$12.18	
Susquehanna	\$6.35	\$5.97	\$4.44	\$8.40	\$8.02	\$6.49	\$10.45	\$10.07	\$8.54	
Three Mile Island	(\$3.41)	(\$3.78)	(\$5.29)	(\$0.52)	(\$0.89)	(\$2.40)	\$2.37	\$2.00	\$0.49	


Profile of units at risk of retirement

Technology	No. Units	ICAP (MW)	Avg. 2017 Run Hrs	Avg. Unit Age (Yrs)	Avg. Heat Rate (Btu/MWh)
CC - Combined Cycle	5	590	497	33	11,302
CT - Aero Derivative	10	254	137	41	13,724
CT - Industrial Frame	40	955	94	41	14,434
Coal Fired (high)	46	21,039	3,346	46	10,428
Coal Fired (low) (90% ACR recovery)	38	17,302	3,304	46	10,390
Diesel or Oil or Gas Steam	12	889	968	36	11,701
Nuclear (high)	5	7,058	-	38	_
Nuclear (low) (forward looking)	3	2,939	-	38	-
Total (high)	118	30,785	1,560	42	12,312
Total (low)	108	22,929	1,404	42	12,441

PJM reserve margin: 2016 to 2020

	Generation and DR						Pool Wide	Generation and DR		Reserve	Margin
	RPM Committed Less	Forecast	FRR		RPM Peak		Average	RPM Committed Less	Reserve	in Excess	s of IRM
	Deficiency UCAP (MW)	Peak Load	Peak Load	PRD	Load	IRM	EFORd	Deficiency ICAP (MW)	Margin	Percent	ICAP (MW)
01-Jun-16	160,883.3	152,356.6	12,511.6	0.0	139,845.0	16.4%	5.91%	170,988.7	22.3%	5.9%	8,209.2
01-Jun-17	163,871.2	153,230.1	12,837.5	0.0	140,392.6	16.6%	5.94%	174,219.9	24.1%	7.5%	10,522.1
01-Jun-18	168,841.6	152,407.9	12,732.9	0.0	139,675.0	16.1%	6.07%	179,752.6	28.7%	12.6%	17,589.9
01-Jun-19	166,715.0	154,510.0	12,559.0	0.0	141,951.0	16.6%	6.59%	178,476.6	25.7%	9.1%	12,961.7
01-Jun-20	163,399.0	153,915.0	12,200.6	558.0	141,156.4	16.6%	6.59%	174,926.7	23.9%	7.3%	10,338.3

Map of PJM unit retirements: 2011 through 2020



RMR history

Unit Names	Owner	ICAP (MW) Cost Recovery Method	Docket Numbers	Start of Term	End of Term
B.L. England 2	RC Cape May Holdings, LLC	150.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER17-1083	01-May-17	01-May-19
Yorktown 1	Dominion Virginia Power	159.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER17-750	06-Jan-17	13-Mar-18
Yorktown 2	Dominion Virginia Power	164.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER17-750	06-Jan-17	13-Mar-18
B.L. England 3	RC Cape May Holdings, LLC	148.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER17-1083	01-May-17	24-Jan-18
Ashtabula	FirstEnergy Service Company	210.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER12-2710	01-Sep-12	11-Apr-15
Eastlake 1	FirstEnergy Service Company	109.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER12-2710	01-Sep-12	15-Sep-14
Eastlake 2	FirstEnergy Service Company	109.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER12-2710	01-Sep-12	15-Sep-14
Eastlake 3	FirstEnergy Service Company	109.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER12-2710	01-Sep-12	15-Sep-14
Lakeshore	FirstEnergy Service Company	190.0 Deactivation Avoidable Cost Rate	ER12-2710	01-Sep-12	15-Sep-14
Elrama 4	GenOn Power Midwest, LP	171.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER12-1901	01-Jun-12	01-Oct-12
Niles 1	GenOn Power Midwest, LP	109.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER12-1901	01-Jun-12	01-Oct-12
Cromby 2 and Diesel	Exelon Generation Company, LLC	203.7 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER10-1418	01-Jun-11	01-Jan-12
Eddystone 2	Exelon Generation Company, LLC	309.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER10-1418	01-Jun-11	01-Jun-12
Brunot Island CT2A, CT2B, CT3 and CC4	Orion Power MidWest, L.P.	244.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER06-993	16-May-06	05-Jul-07
Hudson 1	PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Fossil LLC	355.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER05-644, ER11-2688	25-Feb-05	08-Dec-11
Sewaren 1-4	PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Fossil LLC	453.0 Cost of Service Recovery Rate	ER05-644	25-Feb-05	01-Sep-08

Recommendations: Energy Market Uplift


- PJM should not use closed loop interfaces to override LMP logic to accommodate:
 - Issues with DR product, e.g. non nodal.
 - Issues with reactive power modeling.
 - Issues with scarcity pricing, e.g. not locational.
- PJM should not use price setting logic to override LMP logic to reduce uplift.
- Reduce uplift
 - Increase transparency
 - Require flexible parameters
 - Eliminate day ahead uplift.
 - Eliminate segmentation
 - Include regulation net revenue offset in uplift calculation.
 - UTCs should pay uplift.



Total energy uplift charges

	Total Energy Uplift Charges (Millions)	Change (Millions)	Percent Change	Energy Uplift as a Percent of Total PJM Billing
2001	\$284.0	\$67.0	30.9%	8.5%
2002	\$273.7	(\$10.3)	(3.6%)	5.8%
2003	\$376.5	\$102.8	37.6%	5.4%
2004	\$537.6	\$161.1	42.8%	6.1%
2005	\$712.6	\$175.0	32.6%	3.1%
2006	\$365.6	(\$347.0)	(48.7%)	1.7%
2007	\$503.3	\$137.7	37.7%	1.6%
2008	\$474.3	(\$29.0)	(5.8%)	1.4%
2009	\$322.7	(\$151.6)	(32.0%)	1.2%
2010	\$623.2	\$300.5	93.1%	1.8%
2011	\$603.4	(\$19.8)	(3.2%)	1.7%
2012	\$649.8	\$46.4	7.7%	2.2%
2013	\$843.0	\$193.2	29.7%	2.5%
2014	\$961.2	\$118.2	14.0%	1.9%
2015	\$312.0	(\$649.2)	(67.5%)	0.7%
2016	\$136.7	(\$824.5)	(85.8%)	0.3%
2017	\$129.1	(\$7.5)	(5.5%)	0.3%

Energy uplift charges changes by category



Energy uplift credits by unit type: 2017

	Day-Ahead	Balancing		Local	Lost			
Half Tarra	Operating	Operating	Canceled	Constraints	Opportunity	Reactive	Synchronous	Black Start
Unit Type	Reserve	Reserve	Resources	Control	Cost	Services	Condensing	Services
Combined Cycle	9.2%	8.0%	0.0%	0.0%	10.7%	3.9%	0.0%	20.2%
Combustion Turbine	3.4%	76.3%	2.7%	90.3%	67.3%	2.9%	0.0%	79.8%
Diesel	0.1%	0.7%	0.0%	2.1%	3.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Hydro	0.0%	0.0%	97.3%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Nuclear	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Solar	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Steam - Coal	78.7%	11.8%	0.0%	7.6%	5.7%	84.9%	0.0%	0.0%
Steam - Others	8.7%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	8.2%	0.0%	0.0%
Wind	0.0%	0.3%	0.0%	0.0%	12.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total (Millions)	\$24.7	\$67.4	\$0.0	\$1.4	\$14.6	\$20.4	\$0.0	\$0.3



Top 10 units and organizations energy uplift credits: 2017

		Top 10 L	Jnits	Top 10 Organizations		
Category	Туре	Credits (Millions)	Credits Share	Credits (Millions)	Credits Share	
Day-Ahead Operating Reserve	Generators	\$19.0	77.0%	\$24.0	97.0%	
	Canceled Resources	\$0.0	100.0%	\$0.0	100.0%	
Palancina Operating Pagence	Generators	\$9.1	13.6%	\$48.8	72.4%	
Balancing Operating Reserve	Local Constraints Control	\$1.0	75.1%	\$1.4	100.0%	
	Lost Opportunity Cost	\$3.0	20.3%	\$10.3	70.7%	
Reactive Services		\$18.8	92.1%	\$20.4	99.9%	
Synchronous Condensing		\$0.0	0.0%	\$0.0	0.0%	
Black Start Services		\$0.1	40.8%	\$0.2	93.6%	
Total		\$42.6	33.1%	\$100.3	77.9%	


Operating reserve rates statistics (\$/MWh): 2017

			Rates Charge	ed (\$/MWh)	
					Standard
Region	Transaction	Maximum	Average	Minimum	Deviation
	INC	3.793	0.355	0.000	0.498
	DEC	3.860	0.386	0.002	0.498
East	DA Load	0.346	0.030	0.000	0.042
	RT Load	0.869	0.037	0.000	0.073
	Deviation	3.793	0.355	0.000	0.498
	INC	2.782	0.327	0.000	0.438
	DEC	2.816	0.357	0.002	0.437
West	DA Load	0.346	0.030	0.000	0.042
	RT Load	0.390	0.028	0.000	0.048
	Deviation	2.782	0.327	0.000	0.438

Current and proposed average energy uplift rate by transaction: 2016 and 2017

			2016			2017	
	Transaction	Current Rates (\$/MWh)	Proposed Rates - 100% UTC (\$/MWh)	Proposed Rates - 0% UTC (\$/MWh)	Current Rates (\$/MWh)	Proposed Rates - 100% UTC (\$/MWh)	Proposed Rates - 0% UTC (\$/MWh)
	INC	0.347	0.027	0.093	0.355	0.012	0.040
	DEC	0.418	0.027	0.093	0.386	0.012	0.040
East	DA Load	0.071	0.004	0.006	0.030	0.003	0.004
	RT Load	0.031	0.058	0.058	0.037	0.027	0.027
	Deviation	0.347	0.387	0.451	0.355	0.504	0.531
	INC	0.302	0.022	0.078	0.327	0.011	0.037
	DEC	0.372	0.022	0.078	0.357	0.011	0.037
West	DA Load	0.071	0.004	0.006	0.030	0.003	0.004
	RT Load	0.023	0.058	0.058	0.028	0.027	0.027
	Deviation	0.302	0.312	0.366	0.327	0.415	0.440
	East to East	NA	0.055	0.186	NA	0.024	0.081
UTC	West to West	NA	0.044	0.156	NA	0.021	0.074
	East to/from West	NA	0.049	0.171	NA	0.023	0.077


PJM Closed loop interfaces map




Recommendations: Demand Response

- Demand response should be removed from PJM capacity market.
 - On demand side of market
 - Redesign to facilitate customers' response to prices
 - Payment should be immediate
 - Impact on forecasts should be immediate
 - Metered use is sole basis for payment. No M&V.
- Eliminate guaranteed DR strike price; pay LMP
- DR offer cap should be the same as generation
- Demand response should be fully nodal
- Demand response should be an economic resource
- M&V: cap baselines at PLC uniformly including winter
- Eliminate net benefits test
- Eliminate bankrupt (partial/total) customers from program

Economic program credits and MWh by month




Demand response revenue by market




Recommendations: Transactions

- Submit transactions consistent with power flow not scheduled paths.
- Implement rules to prevent breaking up transactions to evade rules.
- Implement rules to prevent sham scheduling.
- Eliminate outdated definitions of interface pricing points.
- Permit unlimited spot imports.
- Interchange pricing should reflect LMP logic.
 - No need for scheduling physical transactions.
- Make actual flow data available for eastern interconnection to MMUs and RTOs/ISOs.

PJM's footprint and its external DA and RT scheduling interfaces



PJM RT and DA scheduled import and export transaction volume history



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The regulation market results were competitive

Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure	Not Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Competitive	
Market Performance	Competitive	Flawed



The tier 2 synchronized reserve market results were competitive

Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure: Regional Markets	Not Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Competitive	
Market Performance	Competitive	Mixed

The day-ahead scheduling reserve market results were competitive

Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure	Not Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Mixed	
Market Performance	Competitive	Mixed

Recommendations: Ancillary Services

- Regulation market should incorporate consistent application of marginal benefit factor including optimization, assignment and settlements.
- LOC should be based on unit's operating schedule in the energy market.
- Eliminate payment of Tier 2 price to Tier 1 when nonsynchronized reserve price > 0.
- Eliminate DASR Market.
- The cost of reactive capability should be incorporated in the capacity market.
- Implement rules governing tier 1 biasing.
- Minimum tank suction levels should be fixed.

Average price and cost for PJM regulation

Year	Weighte	ed Regulation Market Price	Weighted Regulation Market Cost	Regulation Price as Percent Cost
2009		\$22.99	\$30.68	74.9%
2010		\$18.00	\$32.86	54.8%
2011		\$16.48	\$29.72	55.5%
2012		\$19.02	\$25.32	75.1%
2013		\$30.85	\$35.79	86.2%
2014		\$44.48	\$53.82	82.6%
2015		\$31.92	\$38.36	83.2%
2016		\$15.73	\$18.13	86.7%
2017		\$16.78	\$23.02	72.9%

Components of regulation cost: 2016 through 2017

V		Scheduled Regulation	Cost of Regulation	Cost of Regulation	Opportunity Cost	Total Cost
Year	Month	(MW)	Capability (\$/MW)	Performance (\$/MW)	(\$/MW)	(\$/MW)
	Jan	412,599.7	\$14.49	\$1.97	\$1.95	\$18.41
	Feb	383,918.8	\$16.00	\$2.61	\$1.40	\$20.01
	Mar	396,882.6	\$12.01	\$2.25	\$1.14	\$15.40
	Apr	384,853.5	\$17.38	\$2.70	\$1.67	\$21.76
	May	391,328.7	\$13.56	\$3.50	\$1.39	\$18.45
2016	Jun	379,273.1	\$13.33	\$1.38	\$1.10	\$15.81
2010	Jul	386,423.4	\$16.52	\$2.27	\$1.80	\$20.60
	Aug	386,057.1	\$16.74	\$1.66	\$1.56	\$19.96
	Sep	376,493.8	\$16.68	\$2.32	\$1.68	\$20.67
	Oct	389,241.0	\$14.11	\$2.73	\$1.19	\$18.04
	Nov	374,665.6	\$11.28	\$3.11	\$1.03	\$15.42
	Dec	391,549.0	\$10.14	\$1.73	\$1.25	\$13.11
2016	3 Annual	4,653,286.2	\$14.35	\$2.35	\$1.43	\$18.14
	Jan	395,801.8	\$13.19	\$2.43	\$1.69	\$17.31
	Feb	356,168.1	\$9.91	\$3.68	\$1.38	\$14.97
	Mar	375,627.5	\$13.93	\$6.99	\$1.98	\$22.91
	Apr	371,527.5	\$12.94	\$9.78	\$1.64	\$24.36
	May	367,839.9	\$16.77	\$5.78	\$1.77	\$24.31
2017	Jun	386,015.3	\$10.81	\$7.95	\$1.26	\$20.02
2017	Jul	406,828.4	\$13.19	\$6.37	\$1.82	\$21.38
	Aug	403,294.0	\$10.10	\$9.34	\$1.38	\$20.82
	Sep	354,990.9	\$18.83	\$8.82	\$1.96	\$29.61
	Oct	365,994.1	\$13.88	\$8.51	\$1.67	\$24.07
	Nov	351,119.3	\$14.55	\$6.12	\$2.09	\$22.77
	Dec	395,269.5	\$24.30	\$5.29	\$4.28	\$33.86
2017	7 Annual	4,530,476.4	\$14.37	\$6.76	\$1.91	\$23.03

The FTR Auction Markets results were competitive


Market Element	Evaluation	Market Design
Market Structure	Competitive	
Participant Behavior	Competitive	
Market Performance	Competitive	Flawed



Recommendations: FTR/ARR

- ARR/FTR design should be modified to ensure that all congestion revenues are returned to load.
- All FTR auction revenues should be returned to load.
- Eliminate use of 1998 generation to load contract paths for allocating ARRs.
- Modify long term FTRs to include only a one year ahead FTR
- Ensure that full transmission capability of system be allocated to ARRs
- Eliminate portfolio netting.


FTR payout ratio



PJM reported FTR payout ratio

	FTR Payout
Planning Period	Ratio
2003/2004	97.7%
2004/2005	100.0%
2005/2006	90.7%
2006/2007	100.0%
2007/2008	100.0%
2008/2009	100.0%
2009/2010	96.9%
2010/2011	85.0%
2011/2012	80.6%
2012/2013	67.8%
2013/2014	72.8%
2014/2015	100.0%
2015/2016	100.0%
2016/2017	100.0%
2017/2018	100.0%

Historic Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR Allocations



ARR holder total congestion offset (\$M)

		0	ld					Current		
				Total			Old	Current	ARR	
Planning	ARR	FTR	Total	ARR/FTR	Percent		Revenue	Revenue	Holder	FTR Over
Period	Credits	Credits	Congestion	Offset	Offset	Offset	Received	Received	Change	Payment
2011/2012	\$512.2	\$249.8	\$770.6	\$762.0	98.9%	83.3%	\$762.0	\$598.6	(\$163.4)	\$113.9
2012/2013	\$349.5	\$181.9	\$575.8	\$531.4	92.3%	68.0%	\$531.4	\$275.9	(\$255.5)	\$62.1
2013/2014	\$337.7	\$456.4	\$1,777.1	\$794.0	44.7%	43.2%	\$794.0	\$574.1	(\$219.9)	\$0.0
2014/2015	\$482.4	\$404.4	\$1,390.9	\$886.8	63.8%	57.2%	\$886.8	\$686.6	(\$200.2)	\$400.6
2015/2016	\$635.3	\$223.4	\$992.6	\$858.8	86.5%	78.2%	\$858.8	\$744.8	(\$113.9)	\$188.9
2016/2017	\$640.0	\$169.1	\$824.6	\$809.1	98.1%	89.5%	\$809.1	\$727.7	(\$81.4)	\$179.0
2017/2018*	\$334.0	\$98.4	\$477.7	\$432.4	90.5%	79.4%	\$432.4	\$395.9	(\$36.5)	\$80.4
Total	\$3,291.2	\$1,783.3	\$6,809.3	\$5,074.4	74.5%	64.6%	\$5,074.4	\$4,003.7	(\$1,070.7)	\$1,024.7

^{*} Seven months of 2017/2018 planning period

FTR profits by organization type

			FTR Direction		
		Self Scheduled		Self Scheduled	
Organization Type	Prevailing Flow	Prevailing Flow	Counter Flow	Counter Flow	All
Financial	\$40,811,499		\$46,900,257		\$87,711,756
Physical	(\$9,369,683)		\$10,028,710		\$659,026
Physical ARR Holder	\$17,192,244	\$87,292,443	\$14,251,815	(\$1,834,752)	\$31,444,059
Total	\$48,634,060	\$87,292,443	\$71,180,781	(\$1,834,752)	\$119,814,841

Estimated additional Long Term FTR Auction revenue at Annual FTR Auction prices

Planning Period	Year 3	Year 2	Year 1	Three Year	Total Difference
2014/2015	\$59,598,642	\$30,284,173	\$52,030,909	\$926,989	\$142,840,713
2015/2016	\$67,896,588	\$40,975,278	\$9,936,078	\$303,082	\$119,111,026
2016/2017	\$42,378,048	\$3,854,373	\$11,055,824	\$1,079,901	\$58,368,147
2017/2018	\$6,134,076	(\$1,841,715)	\$12,396,817	\$227,524	\$16,916,702
Total	\$176,007,354	\$73,272,109	\$85,419,628	\$2,537,496	\$337,236,587

Long Term and Annual Auction cleared FTR MW

	Long Te	rm FTR Pr	oduct			
					Annual	Long Term
				Total	(including	Percent of
Planning				Long	self	Total
Period	Year 3	Year 2	Year 1	Term	scheduled)	Cleared
2014/2015	81,666	86,754	131,911	300,330	356,522	45.7%
2015/2016	89,419	99,329	123,400	312,148	355,682	46.7%
2016/2017	97,837	95,637	107,182	300,656	397,258	43.1%
2017/2018	69,161	86,323	108,126	263,609	493,683	34.8%

Long Term FTR Auction compared to Annual FTR Auction

	Long ⁻	Term FTR Pr	oduct			
Planning				Total Long	Annual (including self	Long Term Percent of Total Net
Period	Year 3	Year 2	Year 1	Term	scheduled)	Revenue
2014/2015	\$13,016,512	\$7,176,209	\$6,863,135	\$27,055,856	\$735,998,448	3.5%
2015/2016	\$12,479,874	\$7,378,550	\$5,156,206	\$25,014,630	\$893,043,415	2.7%
2016/2017	\$7,624,149	\$2,105,984	\$11,087,250	\$20,817,382	\$861,031,182	2.4%
2017/2018	\$1,670,521	\$7,210,445	\$9,763,312	\$18,644,279	\$513,587,222	3.5%

Status of MMU reported recommendations: 1999 through 2017

Status	Priority High	Priority Medium	Priority Low	Total	Percent of Total
Adopted	20	15	19	54	22.5%
Partially Adopted (Continued Recommendation)	5	7	6	18	7.5%
Partially Adopted (Recommendation Closed)	2	4	5	11	4.6%
Partially Adopted (Total)	7	11	11	29	12.1%
Not Adopted	32	63	35	130	54.2%
Not Adopted (Pending before FERC)	4	2	0	6	2.5%
Not Adopted (Stakeholder Process)	2	6	2	10	4.2%
Not Adopted (Total)	38	71	37	146	60.8%
Replaced by Newer Recommendation	1 /	5	2	8	3.3%
Withdrawn	0	1	2	3	1.3%
Total	66	103	71	240	100.0%



Market Monitoring Unit

The State of the Market Report is the work of the entire Market Monitoring Unit.

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