Alternative Fuels for Military Applications
By James T. Bartis & Lawrence Van Bibber, RAND Corporation
The U.S. military has expressed interest in being early users of alternative fuels in their tactical weapon systems. Doing so would supplement the services’ use of gasohol and biodiesel in administrative and other nondeployable vehicles. Each of the services has established programs geared toward reducing dependence on the use of fossil fuels in tactical weapon systems, such as aircraft, combat ships and vehicles, and supporting equipment.
If the services are indeed to use alternative fuels in tactical weapon systems, these fuels must be able to substitute for one or more of the three petroleum-based distillate fuels that currently support the majority of military operations. From the perspective of technical viability, a number of alternative fuels can meet this requirement. But uncertainties remain regarding their commercial viability–namely, how much these fuels will cost and what impact they may have on the environment, particularly in terms of greenhouse gas emissions.
RAND examined economic viability, technical readiness for commercial production, lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, and approaches that could be used to reduce those emissions.
Key findings:
Opportunities to Produce Alternative Fuels with Lower Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Fischer-Tropsch fuels are the most promising near-term options for meeting the Department of Defense’s needs cleanly and affordably.
- For biomass-derived FT fuels, the biomass feedstock must be produced in a sustainable manner; specifically, its production should not be based on practices that lead to sizable emissions due to direct or indirect changes in land use. If this is achieved, lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions can be near zero.
- For coal-derived FT fuels, carbon dioxide emissions at the FT fuel production facility must be captured and sequestered. If this is achieved, lifecycle emissions can be in line with those of petroleum-derived fuels.
- For FT fuels derived from a mixture of coal and biomass, carbon dioxide capture and sequestration must be implemented. The biomass must also be produced in a sustainable manner. If this is achieved, lifecycle emissions can be less than half those of petroleum-derived fuels. In particular, a feedstock consisting of a 60/40 coal/biomass blend (by energy) should yield alternative fuels with lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions that are close to zero.
It is highly uncertain whether appreciable amounts of hydrotreated renewable oils can be affordably and cleanly produced within the United States or abroad.
Nuclear, solar, and wind energy technologies may offer important benefits in the production of military, as well as civilian, alternative fuels. But the beneficial hydrogen derived from nuclear, solar, and wind energy technologies is not an economically viable option over the near-to mid-term.
The Military Utility of Forward-Based Alternative Fuel Production
Concepts that have been proposed for forward-operations-based alternative fuel production do not offer a military advantage.
Goals and Progress of the Military Departments
Defense Department goals for alternative fuels in tactical weapon systems should be based on potential national benefits, since the use of alternative, rather than petroleum-derived, fuels offers no direct military benefits.
Current efforts by the services to test and certify alternative fuels are far outpacing commercial development.
If the Department of Defense continues to support the development of technology to produce alternative fuels, it should consider consolidating and strengthening management and shifting support to longer-term goals.
- The Defense Department’s current R & D efforts are overly focused on short-term gains, foregoing the work required for long-term progress.
- Improved management of the alternative fuel R & D program is key to success.
To cost-effectively promote early industrial production of alternative fuels, the Department of Defense needs extended contracting authority for fuel purchases.
The Prospects for Commercial Production
Within the United States, the prospects for commercial production of alternative fuels that have military applications remain highly uncertain, especially over the next decade.
Conclusion
The RAND investigation was limited to alternative fuels, as opposed to the whole of energy use across the Department of Defense. But this study can be placed within the broader context of an overall energy strategy for the U.S. military. The RAND team’s finding that the use of alternative fuels offers the armed services no direct military benefit is consistent with top-level findings of recent studies on military energy issues by the Defense Science Board and the JASON Defense Advisory Group: In short, the military is best served by efforts directed at using energy more efficiently in weapon systems and at military installations. In this regard, the services’ energy programs are clearly, and appropriately, placing the greatest emphasis on measures that would increase the efficiency of energy use.
More on this report available here.
Ethanol fuels have not been called “gasohol” for about 20 years. I will have more to say later when I have reread this report, but this is one of many pieces of evidence in the report that the authors simply don’t know much about the biofuels they are supposedly reporting on.
OK, now I have had a chance to reread the report carefully. The second reading reinforces my initial impression that the authors knew their conclusions in advance. They “knew” that biofuels (other than biomass FT fuels) simply are not ready for large scale use–so no need to look any further than their preconceived ideas.
They show no evidence of any contact with the advanced biofuels industry or with the literature. For example, the work that Gevo is doing to produce butanol by fermentation and then polymerize/hydrogenate it in oil refineries to a perfect C12 diesel fuel is not even mentioned in the RAND report. That is only one of several approaches that have clear near term potential. The RAND folks simply have not done their homework, or they have relied on someone else to do it for them…always a mistake.
I have a number of other comments/observations on this report which are summarized below. • With only 4 figures and 3 tables, the report seems very light on data needed for true analysis. Also, the report is far from transparent about how it arrives at its conclusions. We never know if they are citing their own analysis, someone else’s analysis or just offering an opinion without much substantiation. • It is often hard to take this report seriously. I cannot see any evidence that they really know much about advanced biofuels, let alone first generation biofuels. For example, they use the term “gasohol” to refer to ethanol-gasoline blends, but that term has not been applied to ethanol fuels for over 20 years. We call these fuels E10, or E15 or E85. • The technical viability of many biofuels is conceded by the report, but the report questions their commercial viability. Unfortunately, the report lacks in depth analysis of current commercial status of biofuels and how much production economics might be improved over time. This is inconsistent, because the report assumes that public investment will be forthcoming to improve the economics of FT liquid fuels from coal and biomass—their apparent preferred technology. • If we develop fermentation biofuels, or other biofuels not based on FT, the plant material from which these fuels are produced is widely available, so that the potential to have near or in theatre production is possible with biofuels and the supply lines may be less vulnerable. • With coal-biomass based FT fuels, the high capital cost will likely sharply limit these plants. • The report acknowledges that BP has shut down its Alaska natural gas-based FT plant. Given an environment of rising oil prices and insecure supplies, and BP’s presumed deep knowledge of the market and technology, this fact does not augur well for the FT approach apparently favored by RAND. • RAND appears to assign a high level of technical-commercial risk to the production of biofuels, but not to the sequestration of carbon dioxide. What is the evidence that biofuel technology development is risky, but sequestration is not? • Capital cost of FT is very high, and has been in spite of decades of commercial practice. Technology risk is not the only impediment to large scale alternatives; the capital risk factor is larger for larger investments and facilities. Where is there evidence that the petroleum companies are stepping forward to build large scale FT plants in the US? The shuttering of the BP plant in Alaska (based on natural gas—the best of all feedstocks for FT processing) is a strong signal that large scale FT is not viewed very favorably by those who should know.
• The report largely ignores the issue of oil price volatility, and its impact on the national security of the US. We can’t have a secure country without a secure economy and right now, oil dependence is undermining our economy and security. • We can only get to lower cost fuels as we accumulate commercial experience producing them. The report does not recognize nor deal with this chicken and egg problem with regard to biofuels. • The report raises the issue of land use change as being a key greenhouse gas impediment for biofuels, but the report does not recognize nor cite the latest literature on the subject showing indirect land use change to be much smaller (less than 20%) of that previously estimated. It also does not recognize how easy it is to avoid direct land use change emissions from biofuels…the simple but correct answer is “use no till”. • On page 18, the report states “It is likely that the other approach, geological sequestration of carbon dioxide, will prove to be commercially viable in the United States.” The IPCC estimates that carbon capture and storage adds about 30% to the total energy demand of a coal power plant and about 50% to the cost of the power plant. How do these numbers compare with what RAND estimates as the cost of biofuel production, which does not need carbon capture and storage to obtain low GHG emissions? Since we are not given any comparative data, we cannot assess how well (or poorly) biofuels fare in this comparison.
• On page 65 the report states “The production costs and environmental implications of both cellulose-derived and algae-derived fuels are highly uncertain.” This is true for algae, but it is not true for cellulose-derived fuels. In fact, nearly every analysis of the environmental implications of cellulose-fuels indicates that they are highly positive. And the most thorough analysis of the cost of mature cellulosic biofuels that I am aware of shows that they will deliver fuels for under about $2 per gallon of gasoline equivalent. It simply is not acceptable for this report by an organization line RAND to be so wrong on such a crucial issue. I think it shows that they have simply not done their homework, at least as far as cellulosic biofuels are concerned.
The Rand report is a very nice myopic study of some very narrow conclusions. But from a tactical and strategic view, the study should be not be taken very seriously. The three basic weaknesses, is they assume that -
- fuel just magically arrives where it’s needed and the system works – and this conclusion is fantasy. Largest proportion of deaths on the battlefield are attributable to long convoys whose cargo is 85% fuel, 12% water, and 3% munitions and other stuffs. We have demonstrated the capacity to convert biofuels on site, and many of those biofuels are “drop in” fuels, meaning they exactly mimic diesel, JP8 or JP6 and can be used in unaltered engines.
- we learned after Desert Storm that the “enemy” can burn oil fields, meaning no longer does military theory hold true that “if we really need it, we can just take it”. Many of the wells were out of commission for over two years in Kuwait. This scenario could and will happen again.
- the US military leaves millions of tons of degradable waste at its locations, which hurts our mission, harms the health of our servicemen as well as the people we are defending – and rather than open air burn (which further harms health) we can reduce and convert the resource into something that is viable and tied to the core mission.
I have been part of several studies within DOD evaluating energy options – and every study details the overarching reliance on very long logistics trails and sourcing energy from unsavory places – of which whose crumbs fund the very people that are trying to kill us. Former CIA Director James Woolsey and others talk eloquently on this subject in detail.
In short, the Rand report is myopic, short-sighted and it’s conclusions defy the reality in the battlefield and to the mission of our Armed Forces now and in the future.
Scott Sklar
I have not read the RAND report yet but will after posting this “unbiased” comment. Initial reaction upon reading the title was that any endeavor by the military to explore use of alternative motor/jet engine fuels is a good complement to other government (tax payer) funded R&D. This is as far as government should go in terms of use of tax dollars on advanced technologies, avoiding attempts at stimulating commercialization through infrastructure build-up or premature deployment of products that are in no way ready for consumer markets. Anecdotally, perhaps a key factor in the demise of electric vehicles in the early 1900′s was the First World War, where the military had a real need for versatile, reliable and on-demand mobility….the gas tank prevailed over the battery, as is pretty much the case today.